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motive;42 thus, a tenant has no property interest in the renewal of his
tenancy. The court, therefore, in precluding Windward Partners from
terminating for retaliatory reasons the month-to-month tenancies of the
eight tenants in this case, seems to have recognized an expectancy-i e.,
"a property interest"-in the renewal of periodic tenancies.
For this reason the court's decision may signal a significant change in
the judicial attitude toward the doctrine of retaliatory eviction.43
Courts originally fashioned the retaliatory eviction doctrine in response
to the public policy need for private citizens' reports of housing code
violations.44 The Windward Partners court may have shifted the doc-
trine's foundation to the need to protect tenants from retaliating land-
lords.
45
DOMESTIC LAW-DIVORCE-KENTUCKY INCLUDES LICENSE TO
PRACTICE DENTISTRY IN MARITAL PROPERTY DIVISION. Inman v. In-
man, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). Early in the Inmans' seven-
teen-year marriage, Mrs. Inman worked as a teacher to enable her
husband to attend dental school. Although Dr. Inman worked steadily
as a dentist after obtaining his license and the Inmans acquired several
42. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
43. California may have followed Hawaii's lead in extending a common-law retaliatory evic-
tion defense to tenants beyond its statutory defense. In Vargas v. Municipal Court, 22 Cal. 3d 902,
587 P.2d 714, 150 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1978), the court allowed an agricultural tenant to assert a com-
mon-law retaliatory eviction defense in addition to its statutory defense. The landlord conceded
that the common-law defense existed, but claimed that the lower court lacked jurisdiction. This
concession is surprising in light of four law review articles that had debated the question of
whether a common-law retaliatory eviction defense still existed in California after enactment of
the California statute. See Moskovitz, supra note 40; Note, supra note 33; Comment, Calfornia's
Common La, Defense Against Landlord Retaliatory Conduct, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1161 (1975); 22
HASTINGS L.J. 1365 (1971). The California Supreme Court noted this debate and expressly left
open the question in S.P. Growers Ass'n v. Rodriguez, 17 Cal. 3d 719, 729 n.4, 552 P.2d 721, 727
n.4, 131 Cal. Rptr. 761, 767 n.4 (1976). But see Laster v. Bowman, 52 Ohio App. 2d 379, 370
N.E.2d 767 (1977) (statute is exclusive remedy available to evicted tenants).
44. See notes 6-10 supra and accompanying text.
45. If the interest granted to the tenants in Windward extends one step further, a situation
may develop in which a landlord cannot evict a tenant without good cause. See D.C. CODE
ENCYCL. § 45-1653 (West Supp. 1978-1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 (West Supp. 1979-
1980); note 8 supra. Tenants in these states seem to have an even greater "property interest" in
their tenancies than the Windward tenants.
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valuable items of property, bad investments and inept management of
the dental practice left the couple on the brink of bankruptcy at the
time of their divorce. A Kentucky circuit court, however, classified Dr.
Inman's dental license as marital property. On this basis, it distributed
most of the marital assets to Mrs. Inman, allocated virtually all the
concomitant financial burdens to Dr. Inman, and awarded Mrs. Inman
maintenance of $100 per month. The Kentucky Court of Appeals cau-
tiously affirmed in principle the circuit court's decision regarding the
license and held.- To reach an equitable result in a dissolution of mar-
riage proceeding, a circuit court may find a marital property interest in
a spouse's professional license if the couple acquired little or no marital
property through the increased earning capacity of the license obtained
with the other spouse's support.'
In a divorce action the power of a state court to transfer property
between spouses, either in addition to or in lieu of alimony, depends
upon the state's enabling statute.2 Kentucky's statute provides for divi-
sion and distribution of marital property in a manner that is economi-
cally just.3 The statute on its face seems to allow for the inclusion of a
1. Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979). The court expressed "strong reser-
vations about placing a professional license in the category of marital property," but concluded
that in "certain instances. . . treating a professional license as marital property is the only way in
which a court can achieve an equitable result." Id. at 268.
The court of appeals found, however, that the circuit court had not made sufficient findings of
fact to support its particular division of the marital property. The court of appeals thus remanded
the case for a determination of "a) the approximate dollar value of Sue Inman's contribution to
Dr. Inman's acquisition of a license to practice dentistry, b) the approximate dollar value of Dr.
Inman's increased earning capacity, [and) c) the approximate dollar value, if any, of Mrs. Inman's
contribution to the worth of Dr. Inman's practice." Id. at 270.
The court of appeals also held that the circuit court's award of periodic maintenance was im-
proper under Kentucky statute in view of the award of child support, the disposition of property to
Mrs. Inman, and the demonstrated ability of Mrs. Inman to support herself. Id. The court of
appeals further directed the lower court, in its redivision of the marital assets and debts, to con-
sider the extent to which Mrs. Inman was a willing participant in the acquisition of the marital
debts and the effect on the relative burdens and benefits of the parties caused by foreclosure on the
marital domicile since the circuit court's decision. Id. at 270-71.
2. See generally 24 AM. JuR. Divorce and Separation § 926 (1966); H. CLARK, LAW OF Do-
MESTIC RELATIONS § 14.8 (1968).
3. "[T~he court. . . shall divide marital property without regard to marital misconduct in
just proportions considering all relevant factors .. " Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 403.190 (1) (Bald-
win 1979). Approximately 30 states have equitable distribution provisions similar to Kentucky's.
See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 14-10-113 (1973); OIo REv. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (Page Supp.
1978); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1278 (Supp. 1977).
In community property states and states with equitable distribution provisions, the Inman anal-
ysis is clearly relevant; if a license is marital property, each spouse presumably is entitled to a one-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/16
Number 4] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 1177
professional license as marital property,4 but no Kentucky court had
specifically ruled upon the issue until Inman. Kentucky cases, in char-
acterizing the distribution of marital property upon divorce, consist-
ently followed the rule that courts must divide property acquired by a
"team effort."'
The California Court of Appeals in Todd v. Todd6 was the first court
to confront squarely the issue of whether a professional license or de-
gree7 is marital property.8 Mrs. Todd, who worked while her husband
attended undergraduate and law school, contended that her husband's
education, partially financed with community property funds, was a
half share in its value, however measured. In those states which retain the common-law principles
of distribution the analysis is probably irrelevant.
4. The statute provides in pertinent part:
For the purpose of this chapter, "marital property" means all property acquired by
either spouse subsequent to the marriage except: (a) Property acquired by gift, bequest,
devise, or descent; (b) Property acquired in exchange for property acquired before the
marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, bequest, devise, or descent; (c)
Property acquired by a spouse after a decree of legal separation; (d) Property excluded
by valid agreement of the parties; and (e) The increase in value of property acquired
before the marriage to the extent that such increase did not result from the efforts of the
parties during marriage.
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.190(2) (Baldwin 1979) (emphasis added).
5. See Beggs v. Beggs, 479 S.W.2d 598 (Ky. Ct. App. 1972) (wife's management of house-
hold, attention to needs of children, and financial support of husband while he obtained profes-
sional education should have been considered in adjusting property rights). See generally
Williams v. Williams, 500 S.W.2d 79 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) ("team effort" division of property
unjust because award to wife of use of marital residence for life unless she remarried constituted
award of alimony); Peterson v. Peterson, 479 S.W.2d 892 (Ky. Ct. App. 1972) (chancellor should
consider actual investment in and services rendered by wife to husband's business enterprise).
6. 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 789, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 134 (1969).
7. The distinction, if any, between a professional education or degree, a professional license,
and an increase in earning capacity, for purposes of this issue, has been neither clarified nor
agreed upon by the courts. E.g., Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969)
(law degree is not community property); In re Marriage of Graham, - Colo. -, 574 P.2d 75,
77 (1978) (educational degree is not marital property); In re Marriage of Horstman, 263 N.W.2d
885 (Iowa 1978) (future earning capacity of husband who received law degree is a marital asset).
Courts also differ over whether education, increased earning capacity, or both should be consid-
ered the divisible asset, but the cases "represent a trend toward. . . awarding the working spouse
something, either as reimbursement for the efforts put forth or as a share in the future benefits to
be received as a result of the education." Comment, Professional Education as a Divisible Asset in
Marriage Dissolutions, 64 IowA L. REV. 705, 710-12 (1979).
8. Two earlier cases discussed in dictum the notion of a professional degree or license as
marital property and reached opposite conclusions. Franklin v. Franklin, 67 Cal. App. 2d 717,
725, 155 P.2d 637, 641 (1945) (right to practice a profession is not community property); Daniels v.
Daniels, 20 Ohio Op. 2d 458, 459, 185 N.E.2d 773, 775 (Ct. App. 1961) (court, by analogy to a
franchise, recognized right to practice medicine as property, but no issue was present on whether it
was divisible).
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community property asset. The court rejected this argument,9 but
noted that Mrs. Todd would realize part of the value of her husband's
education through a substantial property award.'0
Few other jurisdictions have addressed the issue. Some courts flatly
refuse to treat a license or degree as marital property."t Other courts
evade the issue semantically by incorporating an amount into alimony
or maintenance that purports to reflect the wife's contributions to the
husband's attainment of increased earning capacity.'2 These cases,
weighing the lack of alternative measures to recompense the wife equi-
tably, indicate that designation of an award as alimony or as property
distribution may not control the amount or nature of the award;' 3
rather, an award of maintenance or alimony depends in part on the
9. Relying upon dictum in an earlier case, Franklin v. Franklin, 67 Cal. App. 2d 717, 155
P.2d 637 (1945), the California Court of Appeals concluded: "At best, education is an intangible
property right, the value of which because of its character, cannot have a monetary value placed
upon it for division between spouses." 272 Cal. App. 2d at 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 135.
10. 272 Cal. App. 2d at 791, 78 Cal. Rptr. at 135. Mrs. Todd received over $100,000 in the
property settlement. This award included her share of the value of her husband's law practice at
the time of dissolution, which the court held to be community property.
11. See Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal. App. 2d 786, 789, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 134 (1969) (education
cannot be monetarily valued for division upon divorce); Franklin v. Franklin, 67 Cal. App. 2d
717, 725, 155 P.2d 637, 641 (1945) (right to practice a profession is not community property);
Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747, 750 (Okla. 1979) (neither an individual's professional educa-
tion nor license can be properly viewed as "property" subject to division); cf. In re Marriage of
Horstman, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978) (court characterized issue as whether a party's future
earning potential based on the party's education or skill acquired during the marriage is an asset
for distribution).
12. See Moss v. Moss, 80 Mich. App. 693, 694, 264 N.W.2d 97, 98 (1978) ($15,000 gross
alimony allowed because husband's medical degree could not be divided); Magruder v. Magruder,
190 Neb. 573, 578, 209 N.W.2d 585, 591 (1973) ($100,000 alimony payable over ten-year period
allowed to wife who put husband through medical school); Diment v. Diment, 531 P.2d 1071,
1073 (Okla. App. 1974) (award of permanent alimony not terminable upon death or remarriage
allowed in lieu of property award to wife who supported husband from eleventh grade through
medical school).
In Moss, even though the wife's income would exceed the husband's until he finished his resi-
dency, the court approved the alimony award because the medical degree was the only substantial
asset acquired during the marriage. 80 Mich. App. at 694, 264 N.W.2d at 98. The Magruder court
noted that the husband sought a divorce just as the parties had "reached the point where they
could begin to reap some of the economic rewards of their efforts." 190 Neb. at 577, 209 N.W.2d
at 588. Finally, the court in Diment actually admitted that "permanent alimony" was "in sub-
stance a property award for the contributions which [the wife] made to [the husband's] increase in
earning capacity." 531 P.2d at 1073.
13. See Comment, supra note 7, at 712-13. The author categorizes these cases into "recogni-
tional" and "non-recognitional" decisions. Although those cases which recognize a degree as mar-
ital property through larger alimony awards tend to be those in which few assets had been
acquired, the author concludes that, "[b]y awarding a large share of the assets to the working
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/16
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earning capacity of the husband.14
Only two recent cases have addressed the Inman issue directly. In In
re Marriage of Graham'5 the Colorado Supreme Court held that al-
though "property," as used in the Colorado distribution-of-property
statute, must be construed broadly, 6 an educational degree does not
fall within even the broadest traditional interpretations of the term. 7
The Oklahoma Supreme Court in Hubbard v. Hubbard8 reached the
same result, citing Graham with approval.' 9 Well-reasoned dissenting
opinions in both cases, however, cited authority demonstrating that it is
neither logical nor equitable to exclude from distributable property the
value of a professional degree, especially when the wife has contributed
to its attainment and virtually no other assets remain to be divided.2"
spouse.. . . the nonrecognitional courts are implicitly recognizing the value of the education to
both spouses." Id. at 713.
14. See In re Marriage of Horstman, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978); Moss v. Moss, 80 Mich.
App. 693, 264 N.W.2d 97 (1978); In re Marriage of Vanet, 544 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976);
Magruder v. Magruder, 190 Neb. 573, 209 N.W.2d 585 (1973); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603 P.2d 747
(Okla. 1979).
15. -Colo.-, 574 P.2d 75 (1978).
16. Id. at -, 574 P.2d at 76. The relevant portion of the Colorado statute is identical to the
definition set forth in the Kentucky statute. See note 4 supra.
17. "[A degree] does not have an exchange value or any objective value on an open market.
It is personal to the holder .... It cannot be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed, or pledged."
-Colo. at -, 574 P.2d at 77. Cf Stem v. Stem, 66 N.J. 340, 345, 331 A.2d 257, 260 (1975) (a
person's earning capacity, even when developed with the spouse's aid, cannot be recognized as a
"separate, particular item of property" for distribution upon divorce).
18. 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979).
19. In Hubbard income from wife's employment over a twelve-year period helped pay for
husband's medical education and family expenses. The court reversed an award of $100,000 ali-
mony in lieu of property division, holding that property-division alimony cannot be based upon
non-property rights, ie., medical training and medical license.
20. - Colo. at -, 574 P.2d at 78 (Carrigan, J., dissenting); 603 P.2d at 753 (Lavender, J.,
dissenting). Judge Carrigan pointed out that a husband's future earning potential or goodwill
may be considered in deciding property division or alimony awards as may the wife's enhance-
ment of the husband's financial status. He characterized the "property" to be divided as "the
increase in the husband's earning power concomitant to that degree which is the asset conferred
on him by his wife's efforts." - Colo. at -, 574 P.2d at 78-79. Judge Lavender also argued that
because awards of permanent alimony are based on future earnings, such considerations should
extend to property divisions. 603 P.2d at 753.
A recharacterization of the issue appeared in In re Marriage of Horstman, 263 N.W.2d 885
(Iowa 1978), in which the Iowa Supreme Court stated:
[A] trial court in a dissolution case where proper evidence is presented may consider the
future earning capacity of both parties and in determining those capacities it may con-
sider the education, skill or talent of both parties. This statement of principle . . . ap-
plies to the court's determination of an equitable distribution of assets and property and
to a determination of. . .alimony.
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In Inman v. Inman the Kentucky Court of Appeals determined that
division of the value of Dr. Inman's license as marital property was the
only equitable way to allow Mrs. Inman a "return on her invest-
ment."2'
The court first determined that a professional degree or license con-
stituted "property" within the meaning of the Kentucky marital distri-
bution statute.22 The court recognized that "a license to practice a
profession lacks many attributes of most sorts of property, ' 23 but draw-
ing upon the Graham dissent,24 emphasized that courts have accepted
earning capacity as property in other contexts. 25 The court established
an equitable standard for determining whether property is marital in a
particular case. This standard includes consideration of such factors as
whether more traditional marital property is available for division, the
extent to which the wife already has benefited financially from her
spouse's enhanced earning capacity or is eligible for maintenance, and
Id. at 891. The court purported to have "no quarrel" with the Graham decision regarding the
educational concept, but seemed more aligned with Graham's dissent in concluding that it is "the
potential for increase in future earning capacity made possible by the law degree and certificate of
admission conferred upon the husband with the aid of his wife's efforts which constitutes the asset
for distribution by the court." Id.
21. 578 S.W.2d at 268.
22. Id.; see note 4 and accompanying text.
23. 578 S.W.2d at 267.
24. The court quoted with approval from the dissenting opinion in Graham: "[Elquity de-
mands that the courts seek extraordinary remedies to prevent extraordinary injustice." Id. at 269.
25. The court noted that one who tortiously destroys or reduces another's earning capacity
must make monetary compensation for that loss. Id. The court drew further support from the
non-transferable property interests protected by the fourteenth amendment.
The court also pointed to the Supreme Court's recognition of tenured federal employment and
government "largesse" as property interests. Id. In this context the court could have noted that
courts have recognized the right to practice a profession, as evidenced by a license issued by the
state, to be a property interest protected by the fourteenth amendment. See Note, Due Process
Limitations on Occupational Licensing, 59 VA. L. REv. 1097 (1973).
The Graham majority, in contrast, looked to a general property definition-"everything that has
exchangeable value or which goes to make up wealth or estate." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1382
(rev. 4th ed. 1961)-and cited Ellis v. Ellis, 191 Colo. 317, 552 P.2d 506 (1976) (military retirement
pay not property because it has no lump sum value and terminates on death of the owner). Sev-
eral states, however, have recognized nonvested or vested but unmatured pension benefits as assets
includable in a division of property. See In re Marriage of Brown, 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 56 1,
126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976) (nonvested pension rights more than mere expectancies because based
upon a contractual right that is a form of property); Taggart v. Taggart, 552 S.W.2d 422 (Tex.
1977) (retirement benefits subject to division); Wilder v. Wilder, 85 Wash. 2d 364, 534 P.2d 1355
(1975) (trial court should consider all circumstances and evaluate probability that pension will be
enjoyed).
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the degree to which support during marriage was reciprocal.z6
The Inman court, however, next proceeded to limit a spouse's inter-
est in the professional degree to the "amount spent during the period of
education, plus reasonable interest and adjustments for inflation."' 7
Finally, the court concluded that, in some cases, no alternative to
division of a license or degree as marital property is available. Al-
though historically fault was relevant in determining alimony, 8 mod-
em statutes focus more on actual need; in Kentucky a spouse who is
not "unable to support himself through appropriate employment"2 9
will not receive payments. Alimony, moreover, generally is modifiable,
but a property division is not.3" Alimony, unlike a property division,
normally ends upon the recipient spouse's remarriage or death. In
such circumstances, therefore, no other method may grant the contrib-
uting spouse an equitable share of the ultimate benefit to the commu-
nity.3 2
The Kentucky Court of Appeals' extension in Inman of the concept
of marital property to include a professional license is consistent with
the Kentucky legislature's goal of equitable division of family resources
26. 578 S.w.2d at 269.
27. Id. at 269-70. The court's remand instructions, however, see note I supra, seem to re-
quire findings more extensive than would be necessary to satisfy the court's stated measure of
valuation. This result probably reflects the court's "strong reservations about placing a profes-
sional license in the category of marital property." 578 S.W.2d at 268. One might expect, there-
fore, that the court, despite the standard it formulated for valuing a spouse's interest, would
uphold larger or smaller awards as its sense of equity required. See generally Comment, The
Interest of the Communitr in a Professional Education, 10 CAL. W.L. REV. 590 (1974).
28. 578 S.W.2d at 270. See - Colo. at -, 574 P.2d at 78 (Carrigan, J., dissenting); 603 P.2d
at 753 (Lavender, J., dissenting).
29. For a discussion of the distinction between a decree granting alimony and a decree order-
ing transfer of property, see H. CLARK, supra note 2.
30. H. CLARK, supra note 2.
31. Id.
32. See 578 S.W.2d at 269. Both Judge Carrigan in Graham and Judge Lavender in Hub-
bard recognized the possibility that the wife's ability to support herself while her husband was
establishing a career may operate to deny her any maintenance. See note 20 supra.
Judge Wilhoit, dissenting in Inman, argued that the "'standard of living established during the
marriage" provision of subsection (2)(c) [of Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.200 (Baldwin 1979)] "is to
be considered in determining whether a spouse is able to support himself.'" 578 S.W.2d at 271
(quoting Casper v. Casper, 510 S.W.2d 253 (1974)). This standard, however, offers little help in
situations in which a couple's standard of living is generally low, because a spouse is in school or,
as in Inman, their standard of living is a false one. See White & Stone, A Study of.41imony and
Child Support Rulings With Some Recommendations, 10 FAM. L.Q. 75 (1976). Some form of ali-
mony was granted in only 24A3% of the cases surveyed. In the cases in which it was granted, 76%
called for rehabilitative alimony and 24% for permanent alimony. Id. at 80.
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upon dissolution of marriage and the Kentucky statute's broad defini-
tion of marital property. In refusing to be "hamstrung by narrow defi-
nitions of property," 33 the Inman court has taken a major step toward
insuring that a person who puts his or her spouse through professional
or graduate school will not be economically handicapped upon dissolu-
tion of the marriage.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEx DISCRIMINATION-WORKMEN'S
COMPENSATION PRESUMPTION OF WIDOW'S DEPENDENCY DOES NOT
VIOLATE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. Wengler v. Druggists Mutual
Insurance Co., 583 S.W.2d 162 (Mo. 1979). Respondent Wengler
claimed workmen's compensation benefits' for the death of his wife in
a work-related accident. Because Wengler was unable to demonstrate
the requisite dependency,2 the referee denied him compensation. The
Labor and Industrial Relations Committee affirmed the referee's deci-
sion, but the circuit court reversed, holding the statute unconstitu-
tional.3 On appeal, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed and held-
The Missouri workmen's compensation statute, which affords a widow
33. 578 S.W.2d at 269.
1. Wengler filed his claim under Mo. REv. STAT. § 287.240 (1978). Subsection 2 provides
that "[tihe employer shall also pay to the total dependents of the employee a single total death
benefit .. " Subsection 4 defines
"dependent". . . to mean a relative by blood or marriage of a deceased employee, who
is actually dependent for support, in whole or in part, upon his wages at the time of the
injury. The following persons shall be conclusively presumed to be totally dependent for
support upon a deceased employee and any death benefit shall be payable to them, to the
exclusion of other total dependents:
(a) A wife upon a husband legally liable for her support, and a husband mentally or
physically incapacitated from wage earning upon a wife; provided, that on the
death or remarriage of a widow, the death benefit shall cease unless there be other
total dependents entitled to any unpaid remainder of such death benefit under this
chapter.
2. Id. § 287.240. Widows, under the conclusive presumption of dependency, are immedi-
ately eligible for workmen's compensation benefits. The same presumption is denied widowers,
Only a husband who is unable to work because of mental or physical deficiencies is presumed
dependent for support; all other widowers must prove dependency on their deceased wives' wages,
3. The circuit court held that the statute denied equal protection to the widower by requir-
ing proof of dependency while affording a widow the conclusive presumption of dependency at
the death of her husband. Thus, the circuit court's analysis emphasized the disadvantages felt by
the widower, instead of the detriment imposed upon the woman worker whose employment did
not produce the same benefits as that of a male worker. Wengler v. Druggist Mut. Ins. Co., 583
S.W.2d 162, 167 (Mo. 1979).https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1979/iss4/16
